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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the reality behind the 
politician's perception that redistricting matters. There are, of 
course, many dimensions to that perception since redistricting has many 
effects. This paper will focus on the impact that boundary changes 
have on the partisan composition of seats. In order to do this, it 
will be necessary to specify what the expected partisan effects of 
redistricting are and how they can be measure. Thus, the paper first 
explains how the impact of redistricting will vary with the strategy of 
particular plans. Following this, there is an exploration of some 
techniques for measuring the partisan impact of boundary changes, and 
then a detailed analysis of the most important Congressional 
redistricting in 1982�the Burton plan in California. 
ASSESSING THE PARTISAN EFFECTS OF REDISTRICTING 
Bruce E. Cain 
Most legislators believe that redistricting is a life or death 
matter. The prospect of even minor changes in district lines can 
arouse great anxiety in a legislator. The public, on the other hand, 
does not usually share legislators' interest in these matters. Since 
boundary issues are somewhat esoteric by the standards of normal 
political discourse, only severely addicted political junkies are 
willing or able to follow redistricting disputes closely. 
Political scientists also tend to be skeptical about the real 
importance of redistricting. Early studies indicated that the first 
reapportioDJD.ents after Baker v. Carr advantaged Democrats, especially 
in urban areas (Erikson, 1972) . However, attempts to link boundary 
with policy changes uncovered nothing striking (Bicker, 1972; O'Rourke, 
1980; Saffel, 1983) . Other studies seemed to imply that the major 
effect of redistricting was to aid incumbents (Mayhew, 1971; Tufte, 
1973) , but to date there has been very little evidence in support of 
that thesis either (Bullock, 1975; Ferejohn, 1977) . Could it be then 
that redistricting really does not have any important impact upon the 
political system? Are legislators mistaken to worry as much as they do 
about the partisan effects of boundary changes? 
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The purpose of this paper is to assess the reality behind the 
politician's perception that redistricting matters. There are, of 
course, many dimensions to that perception since redistricting has many 
effects. This paper will focus on the impact that boundary changes 
have on the partisan composition of seats. In order to do this, it 
will be necessary to specify what the expected partisan effects of 
redistricting are and how they can be measured. Thus, the paper first 
explains how the impact of redistricting will vary with the strategy of 
particular plans. Following this, there is an exploration of some 
techniques for measuring the partisan impact of boundary changes, and 
then a detailed analysis of the most important Congressional 
redistricting in 1982�the Burton plan in California. 
PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF REDISTRICTING 
One of the reasons that it has been so difficult to find any 
systematic or striking redistricting effects is that the types of 
redistrictings undertaken have varied significantly across states and 
periods of time. In particular, the way that a plan affects electoral 
outcomes depends upon the strategy of the linedrawers and the nature of 
the demographic constraints they face. As to the first, a 
redistricting plan can be either partisan or bipartisan in its impact. 
A partisan effect is one that favors a particular party (usually the 
majority party) over the other and a bipartisan one favors neither 
party. To be sure, a redistricting plan will usually have other goals 
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such as the preservation of cities, the protection of minorities and 
the like, but the political impact is the sole concern of this study. 
It is also important to recognize that a plan's effect may be 
different from its intent. A nonpartisan connnission might try to 
ignore partisan considerations, but any plan that it implements will 
nonetheless have partisan consequences (Dixon, 1968; Cain, 
forthcoming). 
Assume that the strategy of a plan is partisan and that the party 
controlling reapportionment is the one with a majority in both houses 
of the state legislature, how can the number of majority party seats be 
maximized, and what will the predicted pattern of changes be7 The 
answer is that maximizing majority party seats requires minimizing the 
inefficiency of majority party strength to the extent demographically 
possible. The electoral inefficiency of a particular seat is defined 
as the amount of excess party support enjoyed by the winning candidate. 
If there is a registration level r that guarantees that a party will 
win almost any contest (within some reasonable range of candidate 
strength) , then any level of strength above r is wasted. For example, 
if the Democrats can win any seat above 60% Democrat in registration, 
then a 70% seat is inefficient by 10 percentage points. From a 
partisan gerrymandering point of view, if that excess partisan strength 
could be traded to a 50% Democratic seat, then the party would have two 
sure seats instead of one. Classic examples of inefficiently 
distributed Democratic areas are inner city minority seats and of 
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inefficiently distributed Republican areas are white, upper inc0111e 
suburban seats. 
Leaving aside for the m0111ent the demographic and bargaining 
constraints that might obstruct the construction of a partisan 
gerrymander, what pattern of territorial trades should be observed? To 
begin with, some number of previously inefficient majority party seats 
will acquire less favorable territory and will actually experience a 
drop in partisan strength. To C0111pensate, a certain number of marginal 
majority party seats will receive favorable areas and so become 
partisanly stronger. Finally, few, if any, of the majority incumbents 
should be forced to run against another incumbent or be required to run 
in seats with disproportionately large numbers of new constituents 
(i.e., low displacement) . Thus, there should be an inverse correlation 
between the previous level of partisan strength and the gain made 
through reapportionment for majority party incumbents. 
Just the reverse should apply to minority party incumbents. 
First, the most marginal members of their delegation will typically 
experience a loss in strength due to reapportionment, and the strongest 
ones will experience the gains. In short, the goal of the partisan 
gerrymander is to distribute minority party strength as inefficiently 
as possible. Hence, the correlation between previous partisan 
strength and reapportionment gain should be positive for minority party 
incumbents. Secondly, minority party incumbents will more frequently 
be forced to run against one another and to take very large amounts of 
new territory. In other words, there will be a much larger 
displacement effect for them. 
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The key then to the partisan gerrymander is that incumbents in the 
party controlling redistricting will be treated differently from those 
in the party that does not. The average level of electoral safety 
might actually increase more among incumbents in the non-controlling 
party than among those in the controlling party since greater safety is 
a byproduct of higher electoral inefficiency. If one were to consider 
the average gain or loss of incumbents by party, one might mistakenly 
conclude that the non-controlling party was better off. The point is 
that many of the individual incumbents in the noncontrolling party will 
be better off, but if the gerrymander is effective, the party as a 
whole will be worse off. Indeed, one of the great difficulties for 
leaders in the non-controlling party during redistricting is to get 
individual incumbents to forsake their short term self-interests (i.e., 
whether their particular districts are to their liking) for the 
interest of the party (i.e., whether the plan is good or bad for the 
party as a whole) . 
The bipartisan gerrymander is much simpler. In this case, neither 
party gains an advantage out of reapportionment without the consent of 
the other. Whereas the goal of the partisan gerrymander is to make one 
party's support more electorally efficient than another's, the object 
of the bipartisan gerrymander is to protect incumbents in both 
parties�in short, to make the partisan strength of both parties 
inefficient· wherever there is an incumbent. FrOlll the self-interested 
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perspective of the incumbents, the bipartisan gerrymander has much 
appeal. Incumbents who want to get stronger will seek to dispose of 
their least desirable areas. Because one party's undesirables are 
usually the other's most loyal supporters, Democrats will trade 
Republicans to Republican incumbents, and Republicans will trade 
Democrats to Democratic incumbents. Since incumbents tend to be risk 
averse�no margin of safety is ever too much�the result is greater 
electoral inefficiency and more noncompetitive seats. 
In the bipartisan gerrymander, no incumbent who wants to return 
will be forced, unless demographically necessary, to run against any 
other incumbent. Morever, there will be a correlation between 
incumbency and reapportionment gain regardless of party. Thus, an 
indicator that a plan is bipartisan would be the absence of any 
difference in the patterns of partisan gain between controlling and 
noncontrolling party incumbents. 
The strategies of partisan and bipartisan plans as outlined will 
not necessarily be implemented as they are intended. Various 
considerations will compromise the best laid plans of reapportioning 
men. To start with, population needs will constrain the set of 
feasible trades. It will, for instance, be easier to make a trade when 
one of the two adjoining seats is overpopulated and the other 
underpopulated than it will be when both are overpopulated or 
underpopulated. Trades between seats with noncomplementary population 
needs only compound initial population deficits and surpluses and cause 
more difficult adjustment problems in the rest of the state. Secondly, 
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while trades between members of different parties can of ten be 
complementary because both want the other's weakest areas, trades 
between members of the same party will often be conflictual for 
essentially the opposite reason: both will want each other's strongest 
areas. This means that some strong incumbents will resist sharing 
their "wealth" with weaker members of their own party, further 
distorting the logic of the plan. Finally, there are the idiosyncratic 
concerns of incumbents. Incumbents will in many instances forego the 
partisan advantages of trades in order to keep amusement parks, fund 
raising locations, favorite donors, their residences and the like in 
their districts. So, even if partisan malice is in the hearts and 
minds of the linedrawers, the pure patterns of the partisan and 
bipartisan gerrymanders will be blurred by the noise of bargaining and 
demographic constraints. 
MEASURING THE PARTISAN EFFECTS OF REAPPORTIONMENT 
Having considered the expected patterns of change associated with 
various types of redistricting strategies, the question is whether it 
is possible to measure the specific effects of various plans and 
determine whether a given plan is partisan or bipartisan in its impact. 
We will therefore next discuss the relative merits of various 
measurement techniques. The most appropriate of these will then be 
used in the final section of the paper to analyze the 1981 California 
Congressional redistricting. 
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There are several ways to measure the political effects of 
reapportiomnent. The simplest class of methods compare district 
registrations or vote totals before and after the territorial changes 
caused by redistricting. For example, in states where the registration 
figures are published, it is possible to determine whether and by what 
amount the Democratic or Republican registration increased: 
(1) rd,o - rd,n
where rd,o and rd,n are the Democratic registrations in the old 
and new districts 
Another popular method is to take the vote totals for candidate j in 
the last election, subtract out the votes j won in the areas j loses in 
reapportiomnent, and add in the votes for candidate k who ran for the 
same legislative office in the same election in the areas that have 
been transferred from k to j: 
(2) Vj,n = Vj,o - vj,l + vk,a
where vj,n is the predicted vote for candidate j in the new district 
vj,o is the vote for candidate j in the old district 
vj,l is the vote for candidate j in the lost areas 
vk,a is the vote for candidate k in the newly added areas 
where candidates j and k ran for the same legislative 
office in different districts in some year prior to 
redistricting 
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Finally, where the data are available, it is instructive to compare the 
totals received by some statewide candidate under the various proposed 
boundary changes. 
(J) vs,n = vs,o - vs,l + vs,a
where vs,n is the vote received by a state wide candidate in the
new district 
o, 1 and a have the meanings previously defined 
All of these methods have their particular flaws, but more 
generally, the difficulty with this class of methods is that it does 
not fully and efficiently use all the available information. For 
instance, two districts with the same Democratic registrations might 
have different Republican or minority party registrations. Moreover, 
since redistricting affects incumbency status as well as the underlying 
partisan strength of a district, merely looking at the registration 
figures does not give an accurate estimate of the political impact of a 
proposed plan. 
The second class of methods, therefore, tries to eliminate this 
flaw by utilizing a multivariate estimation procedure to combine 
several pieces of information. One such technique, for instance, is to 
develop an expected vote model in which a candidate's vote at time t is 
regressed on various demographic data and on a statewide candidate's 
vote. This yields a set of estimated parameters that can be multiplied 
times the the post redistricting political and demographic data to 
yield new district totals: 
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(4) vp = a + BZP +c1sp + u 
where vp is the vote for relevant district race in precinct p 
B is a vector of coefficients 
Z is a vector of demographic variables for precinct p 
c1 is a coefficient 
sp is the vote for a state wide candidate running in the
same election in precinct p 
u is the error term 
This is a particularly useful technique for redistricting negotiations 
since it tells an incumbent how he or she specifically would have run 
in the proposed new district in an election at time t. However, its 
advantage as a bargaining tool is also its liability as a method for 
analyzing the general partisan impact of a plan: it is highly 
candidate specific in its predictions and does not provide a convenient 
basis for comparing results in open seats with results in seats with 
incumbents. 
As a consequence, the technique developed for the present analysis 
is to try to estimate the probabilities of the Democrats and 
Republicans winning various seats given information about change� in 
registration and incumbency status as a result of the plan. The model 
is thus: 
(5) Pr(vj = 1) = F(a + BRj + c1d + c2r) 
where Pr(vj = 1) is the probability of a Democrat winning 
Congressional seat j 
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R is a vector of registration data for various parties in 
seat j 
d is a dummy for a Democratic incumbent in seat j 
r is a dummy for a Republican incumbent in seat j 
B is a vector of coefficients 
c1,c2 are coefficients relating the incumbency dummies to
the vote 
The model is estimated with a probit procedure using the registration, 
incumbency and outcome data from the 1980 election that preceded the 
1981 reapportionment in California. The new registration and 
incumbency data resulting from the new boundaries are then inserted 
into the estimated equation, yielding probit scores that can be 
converted into probability estimates. The actual estimated parameters 
were as follows: 
(6) Pr(vj 1) = -9.43 + .016Demreg - .017Aipreg + .007Libreg 
(.004) (.083) 
- .045Pfreg + .015Dec + .822Dinc - l. 60Rinc 
(.136) 
R2 = .83 
( .012) (.460) 
Chi Square s .32
(.55) 
where Demreg is the percent Democratic registration 
( .036) 
Aipreg is the percent American Independent party registration 
Libreg is the percent Libertarian party registration 
Pfreg is the Peace and Freedon party registration 
Dec is the Decline to state registration 
Dine is the dummy for Democratic incumbent 
Rine is the dummy for Republican incumbent 
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The signs of the estimated coefficients on the incumbency and 
Democratic registration variables are significant and in the proper 
direction. The minor party coefficients are not, but are left in since 
they improve the fit marginally. The purpose of this model is 
predictive and not structural. Clearly, the large estimated incumbency 
effect is picking up a variety of phenomena related to holding off ice� 
e. g. , spending advantages, resource advantages, etc. The point is to 
show what the effects of partisan reconstruction and incumbency removal 
are, not to show the causal routes that lead from incumbency or 
registration to electoral advantage. The equation is in this sense the 
most parsimonious reduced form. 
The pre-redistricting probabilities referred to in the ensuing 
discussions are obtained from these estimated parameters by inserting 
the pre-redistricting registration and incumbency data into the model, 
taking the predicted score and converting it into a probability number. 
The post-redistricting probabilities are obtained in the same way using 
the same estimated parameters and the post-redistricting registration 
and incumbency data. 
ASSESSING THE BURTON PLAN 
The 1981 California Congressional redistricting was one of the 
most important and controversial redistricting plans in the country. 
Partly, its significance lies in the size of the California 
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Congressional delegation, which grew in 1982 from 43 to 45. But 
partly, its significance lies in the intense partisan battle it touched 
off. The plan was authored by Phil Burton with the technical 
assistance of Michael Berman�a brother of an Assemblyman who won one 
of the newly created LA Congressional seats in 1982�and Leroy Hardy, a 
political scientist at Long Beach State who had worked on 
redistrictings since the sixties. The California delegation had been 
split 22-21 after the 1980 election and prior to the redistricting. In 
1982, the Democrats held 28 seats and the Republicans held 17, a 
dramatic shift in power that many Republicans attributed to 
redistricting. This plan�Burton !--was subsequently rejected by the 
voters in a Republican sponsored referendum and was replaced in 1982 
with a new plan�Burton II. My remarks are solely directed to the now 
defunct Burton I plan. 
We will examine this plan utilizing the framework of expectations 
discussed earlier to test whether it had the pattern of a partisan 
strategy. Applying those propositions to California, we get the 
following: 
1) Some number of marginal Democratic seats should have been
strengthened. 
2) Some number of marginal Republicans should have been
weakened. 
3) Some number of strong Democrats should have been weakened to
a-ssist marginal Democrats. 
4) 
14 
Some number of strong Republicans should have been made even 
stronger. 
The question is do these expected patterns appear in the data? The 
evidence for these patterns will consist of (1) simple registration 
data, (2) the estimated probabilities of a Democrat winning the seat 
under the assumption that all the seats are open, and (3) the estimated 
probabilities given information about which incumbents actually ran in 
1982 and which seats were open. 
The first sign of a partisan plan is that some number of marginal 
seats in the controlling party should have been strengthened. Table 1 
shows the four Democratic incumbents who gained the most from the 
Burton plan. The first is Phil Burton's brother, John, who represented 
a district in Marin and areas to the north of San Franscisco. Burton 
had received a strong challenge in the 1980 election and the 52. 5% 
registration in his district was by California standards marginal for a 
Democrat. Typically, the seats with the highest probability of 
changing hands fall into the 50-55% Democratic registration category, 
and so it was clear that without assistance, Burton's district would 
remain marginal throughout the eighties. The solution to Burton's 
electoral insecurity was a highly controversial district that meandered 
from Vallejo in Solano county, across the water to Marin, through a 
narrow corridor on the east side of San Fransisco county and down into 
Daly city in San Mateo county. This, more than any of Burton's other 
districts, brought a great deal of criticism from the press and the 
public. 
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[insert Table 1 here] 
The effect of this contorted district was to increase Burton's 
Democratic registration by about five points to 57. 5%. The estimated 
probability of a Democrat winning the 5th CD in an open race was 83% in 
1980. Following reapportionment, it was 91%. Adding in the effect of 
incumbency, the model projects that John Burton, had he run for 
reelection, would have been elected with a 99% probability, up three 
points from 1980. It is important to note the importance of an 
incumbent running, a fact that has been much heralded in political 
science research recently. Indeed, one theme that this study shows 
clearly is that the displacement of incumbents is perhaps even more 
important to the outcome of the first post-redistricting election than 
are any changes in the underlying partisan composition caused by 
redistricting. 
Many of the changes made in the 5th CD in 1981 were taken back in 
1982. The 1981 plan was rejected by the voters in a June 1982 
referendum and new lines were redrawn in December. When John Burton 
chose not to contest the seat in 1982, it was won by Barbara Boxer. In 
the subsequent redistricting, Burton chose not to extend to Boxer the 
same generosity his brother received, and the district dropped back 
into the marginal category. 
The only other Democrat to receive a boost in 1981 comparable to 
the one the 5th CD got was George Brown's 36th CD. The 13th and 16th 
CDs, by comparison, got almost trivial increases that really did not 
improve their marginal status much. So, we can say that in two 
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instances primarily, marginal Democrats were strengthened by the 
redistricting plan while in the other instances, including some that 
are not included in this table, the changes were insignificant and did 
not change the status of the seat. 
The second expectation of a partisan plan is that some number of 
marginal noncontrolling party incumbents�in this case, Republicans� 
should have been partisanly weakened by the redistricting plan. This 
appears to be where the Burton plan had its major effect. In several 
instances, the strategy Burton followed was more subtle than a straight 
collapse of the Republican incumbent's seat. Rather, the best 
Democratic portions were retained in the old district while the most 
Republican areas were used to create a new seat for the Republican 
incumbent. By inducing the Republican incumbent to run for the new 
seat, Burton was able to create an open seat with favorable 
registration for the Democrats. This was essentially the procedure 
used in the Hunter and Feidler seats. Both of these incumbents were 
sitting in seats with dangerously high Democratic registrations, and so 
it did not take a great deal of inducement�e. g., putting their house 
in the new district�to get them to move into the safer seat. A glance 
at Table 2 shows that the partisan composition changed slightly in the 
case of the 44th and negatively in the case of the 26th: the key to 
winning both seats was the removal of the incumbent, which, as the data 
show, dramatically altered to chances of a Democrat winning in both 
instances • 
[insert Table 2 here] 
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The 27th CD is a good example of a seat that benefited equally 
from partisan reconstruction and incumbent removal. Dornan, the 
Republican incumbent, did not have to be given an alternative seat to 
run in, because he had declared himself a candidate for statewide 
office. Since the seat was strengthened by 9 points in registration 
and no longer had an incumbent, it changed from one in which the 
Democrat had a 1% chance of winning to one in which he or she had a 95% 
chance. The 34th, on the other hand, represents a more classic example 
of destabilization in the sense that the incumbent's seat was 
dismantled and he was given no alternative open seat to run in. 
Portions of the 34th were parceled off to various surrounding 
Republicans, but none of the portions were sufficiently large to give 
Rousselot a base to run from. The largest' overlap between his old 
district and the Burton created districts was the highly Hispanic 33rd, 
previously represented by George Danielson and then by Marty Martinez 
after a special election in July 1982. Rousselot chose to contest the 
Democrat, Martinez, rather than face his Republican colleagues in an 
expensive primary, and was defeated in the November 1982 election. 
The other two gains by the Democrats in 1982 did not involve the 
weakening of Republican seats. The 18th CD was a newly created central 
valley district made possible by the allocation of two new CDs to 
California and the rapid population growth in that area. The Clausen 
seat, as Table 2 shows, did not change much in the redistricting plan, 
and the gain by the Democrats seems to have been the result of the 
challenger's strength and popularity in the area. So 5 of the 6 gains 
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appear to have been reapportionment related, and 4 of those 5 involved 
the forced or induced removal of Republican incumbents. 
While certain Democratic incumbents benefited from the 
redistricting in 1981, not all of them did. In particular, some of 
them had to give up prime areas or had to take unfavorable areas 
because they were underpopulated. As a result, some Democrats were 
made worse off by the Burton plan, including Phil Burton himself. 
Burton's seat, the 6th, gave up some of the "best" areas in San 
Fransisco county to help boost his brother's seat. Indeed, when the 
Republicans ran a popular moderate Republican state senator against him 
in the November 1982 election, there was an enormous amount of 
speculation in the California press that Burton might have been too 
cute and left himself vulnerable to a challenge. My model indicates 
otherwise. The probability of Burton losing was unaffected by 
redistricting. G iven that the seat had a 62. 8% Democratic 
registration, a large, liberal decline to state vote and a well known 
incumbent, the sacrifice that he made was by no means extravagent. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
In fact, one of the most striking things about Table 3 is the high 
degree of electoral security enjoyed by all the Democratic "martyrs. " 
All of them had Democratic registrations above 55%, and with the added 
advantage of incumbency, they all had a greater than a 95% chance of 
being reelected even after their districts were altered. Nonetheless, 
redistricting did affect the result in these seats in the subsequent 
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election. Even though 1982 was a more favorable year for Democrats 
than 1980, all of them suffered a drop in their margin of victory. How 
much of that drop was due to a loss in registration and how much was 
due to pure displacement (i. e. , the absorption of new territory and the 
consequent loss of name recognition) is a matter for future research. 
The changes made to the districts of various incumbents can also 
be viewed aggregately, as they are in Figures 1 and 2. The vertical 
axis of these charts shows the computed probability of a Democrat 
winning the seat in an open race in 1982 and the horizontal axis shows 
the corresponding probability in 1980. The line at the 45 degree angle 
indicates points of no change: i. e. , where the probabilities in 1980 
and 1982 were the same. Points above the line indicate seats that were 
made more Democratic by redistricting and those below it were made less 
Democratic. The data is stratified by the party of the incumbent in 
1980 so that Figure 1 displays the data for the Democratic seats and 
Figure 2 the data for Republican seats. 
[insert Figures 1 and 2 here ] 
Translating the expectations of a partisan plan as discussed 
earlier into predicted points on the graph, the pattern in the 
Democratic seats should be that: 1) some points in the upper right 
hand corner, representing the safest Democratic seats in 1980, should 
fall below the line since they are sharing their partisan wealth in the 
interests of greater Democratic efficiency; 2) some points in the lower 
left hand corner, representing the most marginal Democratic seats, 
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should fall above the line since they would be the natural 
beneficiaries of Burton's largesse; and 3) most incumbents should stay 
pretty close to the line since demographic, bargaining and geographical 
constraints put severe limits on partisan efficiency. A perusal of 
Figure 1 would seem to confirm our expectations. The four points 
furthest above the lines are those discussed in Table 1. 
Figure 2 is no less revealing. Once again, our expectations are 
that: 1) some number of points in upper right hand corner, 
representing the most marginal Republicans, should fall above the line 
since they are the natural candidates for partisan conversion; 2) some 
number of those in the lower left hand corner should fall below the 
line since the Democrats would like them to be as inefficiently strong 
as possible; and 3) most points, once again, should cluster fairly 
close to the line because of demographic, bargaining and geographical 
constraints. The data do not conform quite as closely in Figure 2 as 
they do in Figure· 1. To begin with, the three points above the line 
are scattered across the horizontal axis, implying that the Democrats 
did not simply target the weakest seats. However, the reader should 
note that all the points above the 51% category on the vertical axis 
were won by the Democrats and that includes all but 1 of the points to 
the right of the 51% category on the horizontal axis. In short, the 
Democrats won all the marginal seats even without changing the 
composition of some. The reason, which will be seen even more 
graphically in a moment, is that the Democrats made effective use of 
incumbent displacement: i. e. , they kept the registration the same, but 
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moved the incumbent out in order to open up the seat. The three 
dramatically altered seats are the Hunter (extreme right) , Dornan, 
(middle) and Rousselot (extreme left) seats. The Dornan case can be 
explained by his fortuitous departure for state wide office (which 
failed) and the Rousselot point by the grudge that Phil Burton bore him 
for his involvement in John Burton's 1980 Congressional campaign. 
The increased inefficiency of the Republican seats as a result of 
Burton I is evident in the cluster of points below the line in the 
lower left hand corner. These are seats that are already strongly 
Republican and are made even more so by the plan. Notice also that the 
deviations from the line are somewhat larger, reflecting the likelihood 
that Burton felt more constrained by the wishes of his fellow Democrats 
than by those of the Republicans. This can be taken as support for the 
position I have argued elswhere that the risk averse, idiosyncratic 
preferences of legislators form a moderating influence on partisan 
designs (Cain, forthcoming) . One suspects that because Burton felt a 
greater need to accomodate the Democratic incumbents, this intertial 
force minimized to some degree changes in their districts. 
REAPPORTIONMENT AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION 
There has been a great deal of academic and popular discussion in 
recent years about the decline of competition in congressional races 
(Mayhew, 1974; Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina,1977a, 1977b). One particular 
aspect of this debate is whether redistricting has contributed to the 
decline of competition in congressional races. Ferejohn and others 
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have expressed doubts about this, and as the hypothesis is stated, 
these doubts are correct. If the question is whether all incumbents 
are indiscriminately aided by reapportionment, the answer is, not in 
all states, and maybe not all incumbents in any state. Not in all 
states, because some states will have more partisan plans than others; 
not all incumbents, because geographical, personal and idiosyncratic 
considerations will sometimes be more important. However, the 
hypothesis that reapportionment affects electoral competition may still 
be accurate in the sense that how it affects electoral competition will 
vary with the intent of the plan as well as the degree to which 
geographical, personal and idiosyncratic considerations introduce 
random noise into the final outcome. 
Reapportionment affects electoral competition in two ways. One, 
it helps determine the odds of a Democrat or Republican winning by 
restructuring the underlying partisan composition of a seat (i.e., 
partisan reconstruction) .  Two, i t  affects the incumbency factor by 
removing or keeping incumbents in their territory. The model developed 
earlier can be used to illustrate both of these effects separately and 
conjointly. Much of the dialogue about the decline of competition 
begins with the so-called Mayhew diagrams, which are histograms 
displaying the electoral margins of incumbents at various intervals 
during the post war period. A variant of this idea is to create a 
histogram of the estimated probabilities from the probit model and show 
what happens to electoral competition at various stages in the 
reapportionment process. This of course leaves unanswered questions 
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about the duration of reapportionment effects and the role that it may 
have played in the overall trend towards declining competition, but it 
does at least give us a glimpse of the immediate impact in one state at 
one period of time. 
(insert Figures 3 through 7 here] 
First, consider the impact of partisan reconstruction. 
Redistricting changes the competitiveness of seats by increasing the 
Democratic registration in seats that lean Democratic and the 
Republican registration in seats that lean Republican. Figure 3 shows 
the effect of the Burton I on all 45 seats under the assumption that no 
incumbents would be allowed to run. As the figure demonstrates, the
consequence is some visible shrinking of the distribution in the 
middle. However, the results are not dramatic. There are still some 
seats left in the most competitive range and the rest are not simply 
bunched on the ends. Geographic constraints--e.g., not being able to 
use inefficient inner city Democratic strength to help out weaker 
Democratic seats in the rural and suburban areas--and the desire of 
incumbents to minimize displacement--i.e., the acquisition of new 
constituents and the loss of former ones--explains why we do not 
observe more radical partisan reconstruction. 
What about the separate effect of removing the incumbent. This is 
shown in Figure 4, which compares the distribution of seat safety in 
1980 under the assumption that the seats were all open and versus the 
assumption that all incumbents ran. Here the effect of incumbency on 
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the distribution in the most competitive, middle range is striking. 
Large numbers of seats cluster on the ends of the distribution and no 
seats fall in the 50% range. Of course, the reader should bear in mind 
that the model assumes the average incumbent whereas in reality there 
will be enormous variation in the strength of both the incumbent and 
challenger. To some extent, this may be better modeled with campaign 
expenditure data, but the quality of the candidates will in any case 
remain difficult to capture. 
The next three figures show the progression of changes in the 
distribution brought about by redistricting, including both incumbency 
removal and partisan reconstruction. Figure 5 compares the 
distribution of seat safety right after the 1980 election and then 
after the 1981 reapportionment. The post reapportionment distribution 
assumes that the incumbents who held the seats in 1980 would run in 
what most closely approximated their old seat in 1982. Thus, for 
example, it was assumed that Dornan would run again in the 27th. Even 
with this strong assumption, the distribution has been changed some by 
movement to the extremes on both sides of the distribution. However, 
as was discussed before, the redistricting plan induced some incumbents 
to abandon their old seats to run for new ones and caused others to · 
lose in the November election. With the new incumbents in place, the 
situation displayed in Figure 6 shows the almost perfect inefficiency 
of the Republicans. Even though the Democrats were less clumped on the 
end of the distribution, only a few of their seats were left in the 75% 
to 90% area. In short, most incumbents in both parties are in safe 
positions, but the Democrats are somewhat less inefficiently 
distributed than the Republicans. 
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What then has been the total change from 1980 to 1982? The last 
figure compares the two distributions. The answer would appear to be 
that the combination of partisan reconstruction and the artful removal 
of inconveniently placed incumbents can alter the seat distribution and 
make the majority party more efficiently distributed than the minority 
party. In the case of California, it was enough to help swing five 
seats to the Democrats. 
CONCLUSION 
Are the partisan effects of redistricting important? The answer 
would seem to be that they are. By changing the partisan composition 
in a district and removing or retaining the incumbent's base, a 
reapportioDlllent plan can alter the odds of a party winning a particular 
seat. The key to a partisan plan is not simply increasing the average 
margin of victory or even the underlying partisan strength of all 
majority party legislators. Rather, the key is increasing the 
efficiency of majority party strength, which will mean a redistribution 
of electoral strength for the purpose of maximizing the number of 
winnable seats. Some majority incumbents will get stronger and others 
weaker in inverse relation to their initial vulnerability. Simply 
looking at the average registration or vote margin may be misleading. 
A second conclusion from this research is that a proper assessment 
of the partisan effects of redistricting cannot overlook its impact on 
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incumbency. To be sure, the post-redistricting election will introduce 
a new set of incumbents who will presumably also enjoy the electoral 
advantages of holding office. However, the temporary scrambling of 
incumbents can have momentous importance for the election that follows 
the redistricting. This should not be too surprising to political 
scientists since it seems logical that in an era when party loyalty 
counts for less and incumbency counts for more, redistricting tactics 
should include incumbent considerations. Indeed, if recent trends 
towards independence from the parties continue, redistrictings in the 
future could come to focus more displacement issues and less on the 
partisan makeup of districts. 
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